The End of French Neocolonialism or the Next Arena for The Great Proxy War Circus?
The recent military coup in Niger raises uncomfortable questions about the future of Africa in general, West Africa in particular, and the role of foreign powers therein.
»International politics is never about democracy or human rights. It is about the interests of states. Remember that, no matter what you are told in history class.«
~Egon Bahr (1922-2015), German SPD politician.
The recent military coup in Niger, in which Army General Abdourahamane Tiani, “President” of the ‘National Council for the Safeguarding of the Fatherland’ (CNSP) and self-appointed new head of state, overthrew and put Western-backed President Mohamed Bazoum under house arrest, not only puts an abrupt end to the exploitative desires of the former and, until the time of the coup, still de facto colonial master France, but also continues a development in the West African region that is unlikely to please the (still) global hegemon, the United States.
After five military coups in Guinea (1), Mali (2) and Burkina Faso (2) in the last three years, and the one in Sudan a couple of months ago, the July 26 coup in Niger is another sign of the disintegration of the old colonial power structures (not only) in West Africa – and conjures up the emergence of a new conflict hotbed that could escalate into the next major proxy war between the U.S. and Russia, similar to the one in Ukraine. China, meanwhile, remains in the role of silent investor and observer and is now presumably weighing its chances again with regard to Taiwan, should the U.S. need to become even more involved in Africa in the future – which doesn’t seem unlikely in view of the increasing Russian and Chinese involvement there.
What's at stake for France
Since the official end of the French colonial empire in Africa in the 1960s, when 14 former colonies gained their “independence”, the region has continued to be exploited by its former colonial master to the present day.
In the course of the “decolonization” of the 1960s, France released its former colonies into formal independence, but left them state and legal systems that were designed - as in colonial times - to control the population with as little effort as possible on the one hand and to export as many raw materials as possible on the other. It is not enough that France, through the so-called colonial pact in Françafrique, has continued to secure for itself the right of first refusal to all natural resources and privileged access to state contracts; since then, it has also imposed its infamous colonial currency, the CFA franc, on the states, making any autonomous monetary, economic or social policy of the (formally sovereign) states quasi impossible.
The fourteen CFA countries are not only chained to the euro by a fixed exchange rate determined solely by the descendants of French colonial masters, but they have also lost all access to 85 percent of their currency reserves, which they are forced to deposit with the Agence France Trésor.
All of the CFA countries are highly resource-rich and yet highly indebted. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger are among the poorest countries in the world despite their immense mineral resources. This is not surprising given the importance of these resources (especially gold and uranium) to France and other exploitative global players.
The (former) French colony of Niger is the seventh-largest uranium producer in the world, but according to the World Bank, 81.4 percent of its citizens are not even connected to the electricity grid. 40 percent are living below the poverty line, one-third of children are underweight, and the illiteracy rate is 63 percent. Only half of the inhabitants have access to clean drinking water, and only 16 percent are connected to adequate sanitation.
Niger accounts for about a quarter of Europe’s and a third of France’s uranium imports, and with over 50 nuclear power plants, France is one of the world’s leading exporters of nuclear power. The fuel required for their operation is procured by the state-owned nuclear giant Orano (formerly Areva) on the basis of secret contracts, e.g. from Niger, where the group has seized three huge uranium mines and a majority stake in Niger’s state-owned company for uranium processing (Somaïr). [partially translated from source; links added]
Niger’s GDP in 2022 was ~14 Billion USD. The total state budget of Niger, a country two times the size of France, is around 4.5 billion euros, which is no more than the annual turnover of the French nuclear company.
Despite its uranium and gold deposits, Niger recently ranked 189th out of 191 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI).
It is hardly surprising, then, that the new leadership in Niger, in one of their first acts in office, froze further exploitation and export of mineral resources by and to the corporate-controlled West, as Burkina Faso and Mali had done previously. It also appears that they were not really intimidated by the threat of sanctions by the United States or the threatened use of force by ECOWAS* (in the event that former President Bazoum was not reinstated). Moreover, they immediately found supporters in Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea and even Algeria, whereby the first two declared that such an action in Niger would be interpreted as a declaration of war against their respective nations. And Algeria, which has a military cooperation agreement with Niger, stated that it “will not stand idle in the event of foreign intervention.”
Meanwhile, the French Embassy was attacked by protesters waving Russian flags and chanting “Abas la France” (Away with France). France and Italy evacuated their and other European citizens from the country, and the U.S. temporarily recalled its embassy staff. And an ECOWAS delegation, which arrived shortly after the coup in Niamey to “find a way out of the crisis in Niger,” left a few hours later, without having met neither the head of the military who took power last week, General Abdourahamane Tiani, nor the overthrown Western puppet president Mohamed Bazoum. The French dream of unbridled neocolonialism thus seems to be over for the time being.
*ECOWAS - and the U.S. interests
The 15 members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The main goal of ECOWAS is to promote economic cooperation among member states in order to raise living standards and promote economic development. ECOWAS has also worked to address some security issues by developing a peacekeeping force for conflicts in the region.
In September 2016, USTR hosted ECOWAS officials for the second meeting of the United States-ECOWAS Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Council. Among the topics discussed were a review of current activities in support of shared trade and investment objectives, a vision for the ECOWAS – U.S. trade relationship in the medium to long-term, and broadening ECOWAS – U.S. trade and investment cooperation to new areas.
The United States had a $14.1 billion in total (two ways) goods trade with ECOWAS countries during 2017. Goods exports totaled $4.8 billion; goods imports totaled $9.3 billion. The U.S. goods trade deficit with ECOWAS countries was $4.5 billion in 2017, an increase by 169%.
U.S. goods imports from ECOWAS countries in 2017 were $9.3 billion […]
The top 5 U.S. import suppliers from the ECOWAS countries for 2017 were: Nigeria ($7.1 billion), Cote d'Ivoire ($1.2 billion), Ghana ($750 million), Liberia ($91 million), and Senegal ($72 million).
The top import categories (2-digit HS) in 2017 were: mineral fuels ($7.5 billion) […]
[source; all emphasis mine]
***
While most of Niger’s uranium went to France, most of Nigeria’s oil - what a coincidence - goes to the United States.
So three guesses as to where U.S. interests in the ECOWAS states were primarily focused.
To “raise living standards and promote economic development” or to build “a peacekeeping force for conflicts in the region?” – Probably not. Look at the HDI again!
We recall the figures from above: 9.3 billion total U.S. import volume from ECOWAS countries, of which 7.5 billion is for mineral fuel imports.
So what is ECOWAS? In short, an economic interest club (currently headed by Nigerian President Bola Tinubu; another U.S.-affiliated puppet) designed to ensure that the order of exploitation and subjugation maintained by the actors of the geopolitical West continues to be upheld. However, their success has dwindled recently, as the ECOWAS ultimatum that passed without consequences and the recent unsuccessful visit by U.S. regime change specialist and notorious warmonger Nuland in Niger make clear. It also remains to be seen how long it will take for the states of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and probably others, tired of the economic tyranny of the collective West, to leave this club that brings zero benefits to their countries.
The USA is weakening and “Fuck the EU”-Vicky can’t score either
U.S. President Joe Biden on Thursday called for the immediate release of Niger’s democratically elected head-of-state amid an apparent coup there. Biden released the statement on the 63rd anniversary of Niger’s independence from its former colonial ruler, warning that the West African nation is now “facing a grave challenge to its democracy.”
These words from the mouth of probably the most corrupt U.S. president of all time sound like sheer mockery to a nation plundered by its former colonial masters, which has continued to be exploited under the guise of “development aid” and “democratization” since its pseudo-independence to this day.
In addition to the economic interests of the U.S. in West Africa already described above, another (weighty) reason for U.S. involvement in Niger is obvious: an air base that is strategically extremely important for the United States in the Sahel zone. The drone base, known as Air Base 201, was built near Agadez in central Niger at a cost of more than $100 million. According to Reuters, drone operations have been conducted from there since 2018, allegedly against IS and al-Qaeda-affiliated forces.
“Our drone base in Niger is extremely important in countering terrorism in the region,” an U.S. official said. “If that closed down, it would be a huge blow.”
It would indeed be a bitter loss for the U.S. if it were to lose control of Air Base 201, from which by no means only strikes against IS and Al-Qaeda can be carried out. If one takes a closer look at the map above, it becomes clear that the central location of this base in the Sahel enables the U.S. to quickly intervene in the surrounding states (Burkina Faso, Mali, Algeria, Libya, Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin) from the air, should this appear necessary for geopolitical/military considerations.
Probably in the hope of not immediately losing this trump card regarding air sovereignty in the region, the U.S. reactions to the coup so far have also been rather restrained. The roughly 1,500-strong U.S. military presence in the country - most of them to protect and operate the base - has not yet been withdrawn. And apart from the ECOWAS ultimatum (presumably launched by the U.S.), which passed without consequences, and their (so far) empty threat to intervene with a 25,000-strong force, not much has happened so far that would have particularly impressed the new rulers.
Even the usual blathering of Victoria, the goddess of war, who arrived in her new function as U.S. under secretary of state and who did not get to see either Tiani or Bazoum during her visit (she was allowed to speak briefly with the latter on the phone), faded into nothingness. There was no “veni, vidi, vici” (I came, I saw, I conquered). Stupidly run.
So, after the ECOWAS delegation had to leave without having achieved anything and the ultimatum it had set passed without consequence; “Fuck the EU”-Vicky could not hand out any cookies; and her demented boss in the White House did not come up with much more than the toothless statement “Niger is facing a great challenge for its democracy,” it looks quite as if the U.S. is facing the dilemma of either having to intervene militarily itself (or having the job done by the 25.000 ECOWAS “peacekeeping” troops, ready to intervene from Nigeria) or watching its influence in the region dwindle more and more. Added to this is the latest threat by the new rulers that in the event of military intervention against Niger, the life of ex-president Bazoum would be at stake.
Briefly on the role of Russia, the Wagner Group and China
»The crisis unfolding in the Sahel may be a bigger challenge for the United Nations than Russia’s war in Ukraine.« –UN observer Richard Gowan
In view of the latest coup in Sudan, where the U.S. arch-enemy Russia is on the verge of establishing a strategically important naval base on the Red Sea, one may also be curious to see how the situation in Niger will develop further. Especially against the background that Niger’s new leadership - contrary to all warnings from Nuland & Co. - has already established contact with the Russian backed mercenary force PMC Wagner, which is also already operating in Burkina Faso, Mali, Libya, Mozambique, and CAR (Central African Republic). Reports also suggest that they have engaged in activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, and Sudan.
After the military took power in Mali and Burkina Faso, UN blue helmets and soldiers of the former colonial power France are no longer wanted. Mali in particular has obviously sent a signal to other states in the region by expelling UN troops – possibly also to the coup plotters in Niger. It’s a trend, as U.N. observer Richard Gowan noted, “In the Sahel, we’ve seen a number of coups, we’ve seen militaries move closer to Moscow.”
So while the United Nations’ influence in West Africa is shrinking, Russia’s appears to be growing.
In the race for the African continent, not only China is particularly active, but Russia is also becoming increasingly involved. Even in the days of the Soviet Union, many African countries had close relations with Russia. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia’s influence in Africa waned, but in recent years Russia has continued to expand its political, economic and, above all, military relations with numerous African countries, partly in order to displace Western influence.
“Strengthening relations with African countries is one of the priorities of Russian foreign policy,” Russia’s President Putin said in October 2019, when the first Russia-Africa Summit was held in Sochi, Russia, to explore further cooperation opportunities with African countries. On the one hand, Russia wants to intensify political alliances with African countries in order to gain reliable partners in international bodies, such as the UN, while on the other hand, economic relations are to be expanded through trade agreements and investments. Russia also wants to secure access to the raw materials and mineral resources of African countries and support the development of energy and electricity supplies by Russian companies. Above all, however, cooperation in the field of “defense and security” is to be strengthened.
As far as reliable partners in international bodies such as the UN are concerned, Putin’s calculation seems to have already worked out.
When on March 2, 2022, a resolution was put to a vote in the United Nations General Assembly in New York calling for an “immediate, complete and unconditional” withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine, 141 countries out of the 193 UN members voted in favor; among the 47 countries that abstained or did not participate in the vote were 25 African countries, and Eritrea even voted against.
UN observer Gowan again: “It is clear to the military leaders in West Africa that the Security Council, with its two veto powers, Russia and France, is deeply divided. It is therefore unable to agree on strong punitive measures.”
In the economic sector, Russia has also been able to gain ground in Africa in recent years. Although Russia has a smaller economic presence in Africa than the U.S., China and the major EU countries, it has doubled its trade volume there since 2015. For example, Moscow has greatly expanded its arms exports to African countries.
According to the Stockholm Institute for International Peace Research (SIPRI), at the beginning of the millennium, the U.S. sold the most weapons to Africa, but this changed in subsequent years. Russia advanced to become by far the largest arms supplier to Africa, with a 44% share in 2017-2021, ahead of the US (17%), China (10%) and France (6.1%).
Unlike the U.S. and Europe, Russia, like China, does not interfere in the internal affairs of African countries, which makes Russian investment and cooperation more attractive to them than that of Western countries. And by the way, their weapons are significantly cheaper than those of the American competition.
Since 2015, Russia has signed over twenty new military cooperation agreements with African states and now maintains military agreements with 40 African countries. The armed forces of Algeria, Angola and Ethiopia are almost completely equipped with Russian-made weapons and military instruments and a large number of high-ranking military officers from African countries complete their training at Russian military academies. In addition, Russia sends political and military advisors and mercenaries to several African countries.
And the Wagner mercenaries are making a valuable contribution – not only in the interests of Russia but also much to the liking of aspiring military rulers who see this as an opportunity to finally rid themselves of the Western-dominated economic tyranny and exploitative order. A shot that could, however, backfire in the medium and long term.
China, on the other hand, unlike Russia, has tended to play the investment card for years.
Chinese activities in African countries are diverse and include providing loans to the transportation and energy sectors, extracting raw materials from mines, and developing infrastructure and telecommunications. The China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) of the U.S.-based Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies found that the Chinese government, Chinese banks, and Chinese contractors provided $143 billion in loans to African governments and African state-owned enterprises between 2000 and 2017. At the same time, broad trade flows run between China and Africa. In 2016, the Sino-African two-way trade volume amounted to USD 128 billion. Chinese companies have also been investing directly in African companies and projects for decades. According to statistics from the “Statista” database, the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) from China to the sub-Saharan Africa region in 2017 was 23.34 billion USD. According to the statistics, the largest share of Chinese direct investment flowed to Kenya with around USD 4.8 billion. [translated from source; links added]
»The Chinese see Africa as the new growth market. That’s what they want to get into, and they want to keep everyone else out.« –Ganesh Rasagam of the World Bank
African countries want growth and infrastructure – now. Even if they may pay a high price for it in the future.
But the question that African countries in particular should ask themselves is whether the interests of China, Russia and the United States on the African continent cannot also be described as a new colonial mastery? After all, if you look at it soberly, it is nothing else. And that this will really help Africa on the road to true independence, both economically and politically, and of course socially, is highly doubtful at best.
I wanted to write an article on something similar but I guess I don't have to anymore. That was excellent. Your intricate exploration of the historical context and the present-day power dynamics surrounding this event is truly enlightening.
Your examination of the disintegration of old colonial power structures in West Africa, with a focus on recent military coups in the region, brilliantly underscores the seismic shifts taking place. Your insights into the motivations and interests of various global players, such as the United States, Russia, and China, provide a comprehensive perspective on the evolving power balance.
The thorough analysis of France's exploitative relationship with its former colonies, highlighted by the colonial pact and the CFA franc, offers a poignant look at the enduring impact of colonial legacies on contemporary economic dynamics. Similarly, your exploration of Russia's growing influence in Africa, driven by military agreements and economic investments, raises intriguing questions about the changing geopolitical landscape.
The examination of China's investment-focused approach and its implications prompts crucial reflections on the nature of economic engagement and its implications for African nations. Your adept ability to weave together these intricate threads of information and present them in a coherent and compelling narrative is truly commendable.
Thank you for sharing your expertise and perspective through this insightful piece. Your work is both enlightening and captivating, and I eagerly anticipate more of your thought-provoking analyses in the future.